Functionalism and Artificial Intelligence by Connor, Kevin
Functionalism and Artificial Intelligence 
 
Kevin Connor 
 
O 
ne of the most potentially important and least successful 
projects in computing during the previous half-century 
has been human-level artificial intelligence.1  This project 
has been daunting not because we do not understand the 
capabilities of the technology; indeed it has been proven that all 
computers, though some may be faster or more efficient than others, 
are nevertheless no more powerful in terms of the sorts of things 
they can compute than Alan Turing‟s abstract notion of a computing 
device, which he first presented in 1936(Stanford).  Instead, the diffi-
culty in programming artificially intelligent machines stems in large 
part from our lack of understanding of how our own minds func-
tion.  AI research has tended to follow our uncertain and certainly 
unproven models of human intelligence-and hence its failures have 
tended to rest upon the failures of these models.  My purpose here is 
to illustrate the decisive failure of one of the most important of these 
models, and present an alternative view that offers hope for the ulti-
mate viability of strong AI. 
 In Representation and Reality, Hilary Putnam attacks what is 
for computer scientists working on AI the most promising theory of 
human intelligence, functionalism.  Putnam‟s definition of the func-
tionalist model says that “…psychological states („believing that p,‟ 
„desiring that p,‟ „considering whether p,‟ etc.)  are simply 
„computational states‟ of the brain.  The proper way to think of the 
brain is as a digital computer.  Our psychology is to be described as 
the software of this computer-its „functional organization.‟” (Putnam 
73)  Putnam‟s arguments in Representation and Reality are convincing, 
and I will discuss them in the first portion of this paper.  In the latter 
portion, I will present an idea from Roger Penrose: that the promise 
of a model of the mind that is based in quantum physics may allow 
us to rethink the nature of the relationship between computers and 
the mind, providing a new research paradigm for strong AI in a 
world without the functionalist model.  
 The simplest version of functionalism that Putnam describes 
is known as the Single Computational State functionalism.  In this con-
ception, each possible propositional attitude is describable in 
terms of a single state, which remains static across all physically 
possible organisms (“physically possible organisms” include ma-
chines). That is, “believing that snow is white” is supposed to be 
the same computational state for all organisms capable of having 
that belief.” (Putnam 80)  Putnam then conceives the sort of 
model that is necessary for an organism to function in this man-
ner.  Obviously, some sort of thinking language or “mentalese” is 
necessary, and also some kind of function which determines 
whether new sentences are sufficiently understood to be added 
to the language (“c-function” for Putnam).  This organism will 
also require what Putnam calls a “rational preference func-
tion”(Putnam 80) in order to decide how to act in any given 
situation, together with the c-function described above.  The ra-
tional preference function would need some variables to mark 
the particular desires of the organism (i.e., when it is raining out-
side, to allow for the possibility that I‟m sad because I want to 
play baseball, or that I‟m happy because I‟m a farmer).   
To illustrate how this conception would work, suppose 
that I am such an organism and I am presented with a new pro-
positional state, “kittens are small and fuzzy”, and let us further 
suppose that this is a perfectly adequate definition of the essence 
of “kitten”:  that all organisms who had a complete understand-
ing of kittens agreed that they are best described as small and 
fuzzy.  In order to process this state, my c-function would check 
my degree of understanding of “small” and “fuzzy” in order to 
see whether I know enough about the component parts of the 
propositional state in order to allow it into my thinking lan-
guage.  If I allow the attitude into my language, then I assign it a 
degree of understanding based on my degrees of understanding 
of the component parts, and can now access thoughts and judg-
ments about kittens with the aid of my rational preference func-
tion 
What Putnam finds troubling is that when we attempt to 
figure out meaning in this model, “all we are given to go on is 
the current subjective probability metric (the current degrees on 
confirmation), the current desires (the current “utilities”), and 
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the underlying c--function by which the current subjective prob-
ability metric was formed on the basis of experience.” (Putnam 
80)  He says that at least the first two of these things might be 
totally different, even for meanings that we would like to say are 
the same, in different organisms: organisms will undoubtedly 
have different degrees of understanding of different sentences in 
the mental language, and will undoubtedly feel slightly different 
desires about those words.  The result of this is that when you 
and I say “kitten,” we can never mean the same thing, which is 
undoubtedly unworkable. 
The problem is not solved even if we assume that there 
are sentences (“kittens are small and fuzzy” might be one of 
them) that are analytic terms that are universal across all organ-
isms.  Putnam says that this isn‟t going to work because we 
couldn‟t say that “small” and “fuzzy” have the same meaning for 
us analytically, because Putnam has shown that meanings cannot 
exist solely in the mind-that there is a linguistic division of mean-
ing for words.2  If these words don‟t have analytic meaning for 
us, then it seems that we can‟t come to the same analytic mean-
ing for the whole propositional state “kittens are small and 
fuzzy,” or further any propositional state.  As Putnam sums up 
this line of reasoning, “there is no way to identify a computa-
tional state that is the same whenever any two people believe 
that there are a lot of cats in the neighborhood (or whatever).  
Even if the two people happen to speak the same language, they 
may have different stereotypes of a cat, different beliefs about the 
nature of cats, and so on (imagine two ancient Egyptians, one of 
whom believes cats are divine while the other does 
not).” (Putnam 82). 
Another form of functional formalism that he briefly con-
siders he calls sociofunctionalism: “Why not think of the entire so-
ciety of organisms together with an appropriate part of its physi-
cal environment as analogous to a computer, and seek to de-
scribe functional relations within this larger system?” (Putnam 
74)  For example, the state of “thinking that there are a lot of cats 
in the neighborhood” may be describable in terms of the 
thoughts that each person in the neighborhood has about the cats
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-each of their individual states builds together the full functional 
state quoted above.  This is obviously a complicating move:  we 
will have to draw functional relations across many different 
types of organisms and environments to create the full function-
alist picture, which would be perhaps in principle possible. 
Putnam in short says that defining this complete system 
is a pipe dream.  He says that when different people speak the 
same word, they inevitably have at least slightly different mental 
conceptions of that word, like the cat example from our discus-
sion above about simple functionalism.  We need some way of 
arbitrating these meanings; of deciding whether a particular con-
ception fits a criterion that he calls “reasonableness.”  In a society 
of millions of people, each with her own definition of cat, there 
must be some way of deciding which definitions are more correct 
or more complete; and the “real” definition would be synthesis 
of those that are most “reasonable.”  He explains, “…this, I have 
argued, would be no easier to do than to survey human nature in 
toto.  The idea of actually constructing such a definition of synon-
ymy or coreferentiality is totally utopian.” (Putnam 75) 
That is, the project would involve a listing of uncountable 
(in the mathematical sense of infinite) possibilities of definitions 
in uncountable languages-there is no reducible formula for 
“reasonableness.”  Putnam concedes that such a system may be 
in principle possible, noting that “Few philosophers are afraid of 
being utopian…”(Putnam 76) But my purpose here involves the 
implications of the demise of functionalism for artificial intelli-
gence, and we need a reducible formula to program machines.  
The question of whether such a listing is in principle possible is 
moot to the AI programmers. 
Putnam supposes yet another way to reconceive the func-
tionalist argument.  This argument shifts the burden from com-
putational states to computational relations, specifically equiva-
lence relations.  For example, we could try to figure out if when I 
say the word “cat” in my particular environment X and a Thai 
speaker says the word “meew” (which means “cat” in Thai) in 
her particular environment Y, whether we are in fact talking 
about the same concept.   If we can enumerate all of the physical 
FUNCTIONALISM AND ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 40 
details involved the Thai conception of meew and the English 
conception of cat-admittedly a difficult project-then we can cre-
ate an equivalence relation of the form “cat as used in English in 
this particular situation X is synonymous with meew as used in 
Thai in this particular situation Y.”  As Putnam explains, this re-
lation (and ones like it) “…must be a predicate that a Turing ma-
chine can employ: a recursive predicate or at worst a “trial and 
error” predicate.” (Putnam 85)  Since all computers have been 
proven to be as powerful as Turing machines (and therefore each 
other) and recursive and “trial and error” (which we might call 
exponential) algorithms are computable, if slow, this gives great 
hope to a functionalist model of artificial intelligence. 
Obviously, this argument rests on the assumption that 
our minds function in a way very similar to Turing machines.  
But Putnam does not need to refute that claim to make his objec-
tions.  First he notes that in order to make the difficult decision 
mentioned above regarding whether “cat” and “meew” actually 
refer to the same extension, we have to know a whole lot about 
the linguistic and environmental conventions in the situations.  
Without careful consideration of how the Thai language is used, 
it might appear that meew refers only to “Siamese cat” (it in fact 
refers to all cats) as those are the only sorts of cats that one en-
counters in Thailand.  And there are uncountable variables like 
this that need to be considered, even just for our example.  As 
Putnam says, “What is at stake…is the interpretation of the two 
discourses as wholes.” (Putnam 86)  In any given discourse, it is 
necessary to learn something of the discourse before we can un-
derstand its terms.  One cannot know what “existentialism” 
means without knowing some philosophy, or what “adverb” 
means without knowing some English, for example.  Putnam 
finds two critical problems relating to this idea that occur for this 
theory. 
Putnam imagines a situation in which there are two scien-
tific theories from two different cultures, one from Mars and one 
from Venus. These theories are about the same phenomenon, 
and are so similar that an outside observer would regard their 
meanings as identical, once he had discerned that their environ-
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ments were such that particular terms in the theory had identical 
meanings.  If we are to analyze how we would make this claim 
about particular terms in the theories, we need to answer the 
question of what each term actually refers to in each culture, 
which will likely involve determining whether the theories are 
true for each culture.  But if the theories are about large enough 
cosmological concepts, we need to know information about the 
whole universe before we can judge whether the theories are 
true, which is an awfully large reference set.  As Putnam con-
cludes, “…the assumption that in principle one can tell what is 
being referred to by a term used in an environment from a suffi-
ciently complete description of that environment in terms of 
some standardized set of physical and computational parameters 
is false unless we widen the notion of the speaker’s environment to in-
clude the entire physical universe.” (Putnam 87)  Considering the 
entire universe is obviously going to make the problem incom-
putable, which will bring down this theory of functionalism as 
far as AI is concerned. 
The second problem is related: “any theory that „defines‟ 
coreferentiality and synonymy must, in some way, survey all 
possible theories” (Putnam 87)  For example, there are many dif-
ferent theories of functionalism, some of which we‟ve looked at 
thus far in this paper and some of which we haven‟t.  If we are 
ever to write the equivalence relation that defines how we can 
tell whether a particular functionalist theory or element of a 
functionalist theory is then synonymous with another, we have 
to consider not only all possible theories of functionalism in exis-
tence, but also all possible functionalist theories.  The trouble with 
this is that human societies are by their nature progressive in 
terms of how they conceptualize the world, so it is unclear how a 
human being living in any given society could account for these 
theories that have yet to be invented.  As Putnam says, “To ask a 
human being in a time-bound culture to survey all modes of hu-
man linguistic existence-including those that will transcend his 
own-is to ask for an impossible Archimedean point.” (Putnam 
89) 
Putnam‟s defeat of these and other forms of functional-
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ism and his conclusion that our minds are not in any way reduci-
ble to machine states or functional languages seems convincing 
to me.  Since these computable states are precisely what are nec-
essary for traditionalist conceptions of AI, it seems that the 
downfall of functionalism is a deadly blow for the future of AI 
research.  A new research paradigm for strong AI is sorely 
needed. In Shadows of the Mind, Roger Penrose presents how such 
a paradigm can be conceived. 
Penrose explores how the young science of quantum me-
chanics might be brought to bear on our conceptions of con-
sciousness. Quantum mechanics is a reduction of empirical reali-
ties to probabilities.  When we attempt to understand subatomic 
particles, it turns out that we can‟t say as much as classical New-
tonian physics says we ought to be able to about each individual 
particle.  Indeed, basic facts about particles like position and ve-
locity are inevitably altered depending on the sorts of measure-
ments we take.  In short, quantum mechanics can tell us prob-
abilistically how a large number of particles will behave in a cer-
tain situation, but cannot ever predict for any given particle pre-
cisely what that particle will do. 
Penrose says that scientists have been generally unwilling 
to consider modeling the mind on a large scale using quantum 
mechanics.  They might admit that on a small scale there may be 
quantum interactions taking place between the atoms of the 
brain, but “…it seems to be generally assumed that it is quite 
adequate to model the behavior of neurons themselves, and their 
relationships with one another, in a completely classical way. 
“Penrose 348) Once we have committed ourselves to modeling 
small parts of a system in a Newtonian fashion, accepted scien-
tific practice necessitates that we model the system itself in a 
classical way as well.  The result is a standard Newtonian model 
of brain function. 
Penrose argues that it may be possible to define a theory 
of the mind as a whole that is based on quantum physics-that the 
whole brain itself could be described as an example of quantum 
coherence, which refers to “…circumstances when large numbers 
of particles can collectively cooperate in a single quantum state 
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which remains essentially unentangled with its environ-
ment.” (Penrose 351) This coherence would allow particle-level 
quantum interactions to have an effect on a system as large and 
complex as the brain.  If quantum coherence could be demon-
strated, it could act as a bridge between the concepts of brain and 
mind.  The chemical and physical functioning of neurons in the 
brain could follow a Newtonian model and the functioning of the 
mind as we experience it could be explained by quantum coher-
ence.  
How might the mind exhibit this quantum coherence, 
then?  Penrose notes that our understanding of the brain has led 
to a classical picture “…in which neurons and their connecting 
synapses seem to play a role essentially similar to those of tran-
sistors and wires (printed circuits) in the electronic computers of 
today.” (Penrose 352)  Given this understanding, we can and 
must use a classic computational model for this part of the struc-
ture.  However, Penrose also says that research shows that the 
strength of these connections and even the physical connections 
themselves change over time-almost as though the silicon and 
steel in your personal computer were to rearrange themselves on 
a regular basis.  The classical model attempts to explain this com-
putationally, but Penrose finds as Putnam has that computa-
tional models inevitably fail at explaining such behavior.  Pen-
rose concludes, “…we must look for something different, as the 
appropriate type of controlling „mechanism‟-at least in the case 
of synaptic changes that might have some relevance to actual 
conscious activity.” (Penrose 354)  Large-scale quantum coherence 
in the brain between individual neurons is a promising candi-
date for that mechanism.  Furthermore, the young science of 
quantum computing, which uses principles of quantum mechan-
ics and classical computing together to store data and perform 
operations simultaneously and flexibly on many particles, may 
eventually produce machines efficient enough to simulate this 
coherence.3 
Penrose admits that the obstacles to constructing a quan-
tum theory of the mind are large.  He says, „[a human-level de-
vice] would have to incorporate the same kind of physical action 
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that is responsible for evoking our own awareness.  Since we do 
not yet have any physical theory of that action, it is certainly pre-
mature to speculate on when or whether such a putative device 
might be constructed.” (Penrose 393)  The difficulty arises be-
cause once we have our physical theory, we‟ll also need a corre-
sponding breakthrough in psychology that explains the connec-
tion between the quantum model and consciousness.  This might 
seem to be a dubious proposition-Penrose admits that he has no 
idea how it might come about.  However, it is in principle possi-
ble to model the mind in a quantum fashion, while Putnam has 
decisively ruled out modeling the mind in a classically function-
alist way. 
If we could come up with these theories, we could then 
construct a machine whose physical states corresponded to the 
way physical states work in our minds, and would be function-
ally equivalent to humans.  Although the prospect of truly artifi-
cially intelligent machines looks grim in the near term, we 
should not yet give up hope.  Penrose says, “…in a clear sense, 
these are still early days in the physical understanding of our 
universe-particularly in relation to mental phenomena.” (Penrose 
393-4) However, two and three bit quantum computers have al-
ready been built, which are capable of data sorting and simple 
arithmetic.  As brilliant a mind as Richard Feynman believes that 
advances in quantum computing will stimulate advances in 
quantum physics.4 What Penrose has offered us is a research 
paradigm:  strong AI researchers who have been treading water 
with functionalism can turn to a quantum model and begin solv-
ing these difficult problems. 
 
Notes 
 
1 Or “strong AI;” see Searle, “Minds, Brains, and Programs”(1980), 
also Dreyfuss, What Computers Still Can’t Do (1992) 
2 See the Twin Earth examples in Representation and Reality; also Put-
nam’s article Meaning and Reference 
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3 See www.qubit.org; Arrighi, P. “Quantum Computation Explained to 
My Mother,” EATCS June 2003; Steane, A.M. “Quantum Com-
puting,” Reports on Progress in Physics vol. 61 (1998) 
4 See www.cs.caltech.edu/~westside/quantum-intro.html 
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